Abstract. We generalize the model of Krugman (1991) to allow for asymmetric trade costs between regions and for (asymmetric) trade costs that are internal to the regions. We find that industrial activity, in a region, is enhanced by higher costs of importing and lower costs of exporting (more precisely, by a higher ratio between the two trade costs). This suggests that countries may impose tariffs on imported goods and seek to remove the import tariffs in other countries (unilateral protectionism) in order to foster industrial activity. Industrial activity is also promoted by lower domestic internal trade costs and higher foreign internal trade costs (more precisely, by a lower ratio between the two trade costs).
Introduction
What is the impact of asymmetric internal and external trade costs on the spatial distribution of the industrial activity?
Trade costs, broadly defined by Anderson and Wincoop (2004) :
"include all costs incurred in getting a good to a final user other than the marginal cost of producing the good itself: transportation costs (both freight costs and time costs), policy barriers (tariffs and nontariff barriers), information costs, contract enforcement costs, costs associated with the use of different currencies, legal and regulatory costs, and local distribution costs (wholesale and retail)."
It is clear that trade costs are highly variable across countries. They are higher in landlocked countries than in coastal countries (Limão and Venables, 2001 ) and higher in developing countries than in industrialized countries (Anderson and Wincoop, 2004) . Differences in trade costs, particularly those associated with the distance to the larger markets, explain some of the income inequality across countries (Redding and Venables, 2004) .
A monotonic relationship between trade costs and location of the economic activity is one of the main theoretical findings of the 'New Economic Geography' literature. If trade costs are high, economic activity is dispersed across regions, while if trade costs are low, then economic activity becomes concentrated in one region.
In spite of the empirical evidence, most of the theoretical work has neglected the differences in trade costs across regions and the trade costs that are internal to a region, focusing on the case of symmetric trade costs associated with trade across regions.
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In this paper, we extend the model introduced by Krugman (1991) to allow for: (i) the existence of intra-regional (internal) trade costs, possibly different between regions; and (ii) the existence of asymmetric inter-regional (external) trade costs.
By asymmetric external trade costs we mean that the cost of trading from region 1 to region 2 is different from the cost of trading from region 2 to region 1. The assumption that trade costs from region 1 to region 2 are identical to those from region 2 to region 1 is pervasive in the existing literature. Nevertheless, it is clear that some trade barriers like tariffs and import quotas are unilateral (at least asymmetric) and that there may be different degrees of trade liberalization.
2 This asymmetry was illustrated by Krugman and Venables (1995, Section V) in the form of a unilateral import tariff.
We show that in the case of symmetric trade costs, the model is equivalent to the original model of Krugman (1991) with trade cost equal to the ratio between the external and the internal trade cost.
The model
Following Krugman (1991) the economy comprises two sectors (agriculture and industry) and two regions that are identical in terms of preferences and technology.
The preferences of the representative consumer in regions 1 and 2 are represented by the utility function:
where C M is consumption of a manufactures aggregate:
, and C A is consumption of the agricultural goods, N is the quantity of firms, c i is the consumption of the i differentiated product, σ > 1 is the elasticity of substitution among the products, and µ is the weight of the industrial sector in the economy.
The manufacturing sector is monopolistic competitive and produces a continuum of varieties of a horizontally differentiated product using only labor supplied by workers, who are mobile between regions. Production of each variety requires a fixed input and a variable input involving β > 0 units of labor. There are no barriers to entry, and given the profit-maximization pricing behavior of manufacturing firms, the price of any manufactured product in region i is:
where W i is the nominal wage of the workers in region i.
2 See Baldwin et al. (2003) for an overview on trade policy and economic geography.
We represent by L 1 and L 2 the industrial population in regions 1 and 2, respectively, with L 1 + L 2 = µ. We denote the share of workers in region 1 by f =
The agricultural sector is perfectly competitive and produces a homogeneous good under constant returns to scale, using only labor supplied by farmers, who are immobile and equally distributed between regions. Trade costs in this sector are neglected, therefore, the price of the agricultural good is the same in both regions, and chosen as the numeraire.
The trade of manufactures involves an iceberg trade cost: of each unit of manufactures shipped from region i to region j, only a fraction 0 < τ ij < 1 arrives. Thus, a high τ ij corresponds to a low trade cost.
There are four trade costs. The external trade costs are described by the parameters τ 12 and τ 21 . We also consider trade costs for goods that are produced and consumed in the same region, τ 11 and τ 22 , and call them internal trade costs.
On the demand side, the utility maximization of (1) yields the expenditure in region i of a representative region j product:
where n j is the number of firms in region j.
We define Z 11 as the ratio between region 1's expenditure on local manufactures and on manufactures imported from region 2 and Z 12 is the ratio between region 2's spending on region 1 products and local products. Then:
Let Y i denote the nominal regional income in region i, which is equal to the sum of the incomes in the agricultural and the manufacturing sectors:
Since the nominal wage of workers in region i is equal to the spending on region i's manufactures, for i = 1, 2, we have:
Equations (2), (3) and (4) determine W 1 and W 2 . However, workers are interested in the real wage ω i , that is the quotient between the nominal wage, W i , and the price index, P i , for i = 1, 2. The ratio of real wages is:
Equilibrium
In the short-run equilibrium, real wages are determined by taking as given the amount of industrial workers in each region. The long-run equilibrium is a situation in which, in addition, workers do not wish to migrate. The long-run equilibrium is stable if it is robust to small perturbations of the distribution of workers across regions.
Dispersion is a long-run equilibrium configuration where 0 < f * < 1 and regions have the same real wage. It is stable if a small migration to region i decreases the real wage in region i, implying that the initial configuration is reestablished. Formally:
If the equilibrium share of population in region 1 is f * = 0.5, we say that dispersion is symmetric. Otherwise, it is asymmetric.
Concentration is a long-run equilibrium configuration where all workers are concentrated in the region that has the highest real wage. Unless real wages exactly coincide, it is stable. Concentration in region 1 and in region 2 satisfies, respectively:
Results
We consider three distinct situations: (1) symmetric internal and external trade costs; (2) asymmetric internal trade costs; and (3) asymmetric external trade costs.
Symmetric internal and external trade costs
We show that this case corresponds to Krugman's model with τ = 
Asymmetric internal trade costs
Figure 1 compares short-run equilibria in the symmetric case (τ 22 = τ 11 ) with shortrun equilibria when region 2 has lower internal trade costs (τ 22 > τ 11 ). The curve which depicts the short-run equilibria moves downwards, which means that workers in region 2 will have a higher real wage than workers in region 1, in the short-run. In particular, for f = 0.5, the relative real wage in region 1,
, is a decreasing function of τ 22 .
Proposition 4.2. Let τ 21 = τ 12 = τ e , τ 22 = τ 11 = τ i and L 1 = L 2 . The relative real wage,
, is a decreasing function of τ 22 , for any 0 < τ e < τ i < 1, µ ∈ (0, 1) and σ > 1.
Proof : See Proposition 3.2 in Leite, Castro and Correia-da-Silva (2008) .
Point A represents an initial symmetric dispersion equilibrium, with τ 22 = τ 11 = 0.95. An increase in τ 22 raises the relative real wage in region 2 (to point B), attracting workers to that region. The long-run equilibrium (point C) is characterized by asymmetric dispersion.
Asymmetric external trade costs
Figures 2 and 3 show the impact of a decrease in cost of trade from region 1 to region 2 (increase in τ 12 ) on the relative real wage, in the short-run (starting from a initial dispersion that is unstable and stable, respectively). In the case illustrated in figure 2 , the relative real wage of region 1 decreases (from point A to B), while figure 3 shows the opposite effect. The direction of the effect depends on the weight of the industrial sector in the economy. Proposition 4.3. Let τ 21 = τ 12 = τ e , τ 22 = τ 11 = τ i and L 1 = L 2 . There is a µ * (σ, τ ) ∈ (0, 1) such that:
Proof : See Proposition 3.3 in Leite, Castro and Correia-da-Silva (2008) .
In figure 3 , we observe an asymmetric dispersion equilibrium, in the long-run. An increase in τ 12 increases the relative real wage in region 1 attracting new workers to the region. The migration to region 1 leads to a decrease in ω 1 /ω 2 . This process continues until a new long-run equilibrium is reached, point C, with ω 1 = ω 2 . and µ = 0.3). With a low µ, an increase in τ 12 decreases the relative real wage in region 2, in the short-run.
Concluding Remarks
We have extended the model of Krugman (1991) in order to study the effects of internal and external trade costs on the location of industrial activity. The existence of an asymmetric dispersion equilibrium is not surprising, given that under distinct trade costs, the regions no longer are identical.
We find that industrial activity in a region is enhanced, ceteris paribus, by lower internal trade costs and by higher costs of importing (lower costs of exporting). The fact that asymmetries in the external trade costs lead to relocation of economic activity is a natural result.
